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Introduction. Studies of philosophical-legal views of a prominent British philosopher, professor
of Oxford, Herbert Hart (1907 Hart ( −1992 are widely represented in foreign literature. Similar inquiries (though quite small in number) are also present in the Russian theory (Drobyshevskii, 2015; Grafskii, 2012; Kozlikhin, Poliakov, Timoshina, 2015; Didikin, Ogleznev, 2012; Kasatkin, 2014; etc.) . In this article we focus on a rarely emphasized aspect of Hart's work: his critics on a logical-deductive model of judicial decision (widespread in continental jurisprudence). We will turn to two examples of the author's criticism preceding his basic treatise The Concept of Law (1961) (Hart, 1994) . These are Hart's 1949 essay The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights (Hart, 1951) (Hart, 1983b) .
and his 1958 essay Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals
Although these papers receive significantly less attention from researchers, they are seemed to fix important aspects of the topic in question.
The concept of ascriptivity and defeasibility (1949) . Let us begin with the 1949 essay where the problems of legal/judicial decision are considered by the author within a context of general criticism of the so-called "descriptive fallacy"
(understanding of language as a machinery of descriptions, a project of empirically and logically determined epistemology (Austin, 1962) ) -criticism exercised from a standpoint of analytical linguistic philosophy.
Hart challenges a vision of law as a descriptive-deductive system of concepts correlated with external objects by means of formulas that define universal conditions of the concepts' applicability, and rejects a resulting deductive interpretation of judicial decision (Hart, 1951, S. I) . According to the author, this approach ignores specific features of a legal/ judicial discourse (and a socio-normative discourse in general). Among those features he names an ascriptive, vague and defeasible nature of legal concepts (and relevant utterances). 1) Ascriptivity is understood by Hart in two ways. On the one hand, it is a "nonfactual" character of basic legal (and all "social", institutional) concepts, such as property, action, contract, crime, right, duty, etc., i.e. their lack of direct empirical referents (Ibid., S. III; Hart, 1983a, S. I−III). On the other hand, it is a special speech function of legal and similar ordinary utterances (in a spirit of J.L. Austin's "performatives" (Austin, 1962) ), which consists in ascribing rights, responsibilities and so on (Hart, 1951, Intro, S. II−III), or, in other words, in producing speech acts with rules or in making normative conclusions (Hart, 1983a, S. II−III) . In this context distinctive judicial utterances ("It's yours", "He did it", etc.), in Hart's view, constitute speech actions based on the existing norms, claims and evidences irreducible to a description and evaluated by their appropriateness (legitimacy, validity, "felicity" and so forth). They have a complex structure (not identical with a structure of a traditional description) representing a compound or a blend of (empirical) a fact and a norm (a set of legal norms). In the framework of such acts a socionormative/conventional status and consequences are ascribed to certain observable states of affairs (which, e.g., is evident from a difference between concepts like "a piece of earth" and "a piece of property", "a human movement" and "a human action", etc.) (Hart, 1951, S. III) . Thus, according Hart's idea of defeasibility can be seen to include "logical-procedural" and "factual- to exercise discretion (for example, a choice/ discretion as to whether some prohibition of vehicles in a park embraces planes, bicycles, or toy cars?) (Hart, 1983b, p. 63) . Later this feature of language and normative regulation to be vague or indeterminate in its application to borderline cases will be famously called an "open texture" (Hart, 1994, Ch. 7) . Hence, Hart firstly rejects formalism (distinguishing it from positivism) that ignores situations of indeterminacy undermining deduction. Secondly, he associates rationality of conclusion not with logic (as only a formal hypothetical connection between premises and consequences (Hart, 1983b, p. 67) ), but with art of interpretation and qualification of particulars,
i.e. with establishing meaning of relevant legal rules and their relation to concrete situations.
Thirdly, he refuses a practice of "blind" decisions tied up with formalism -the philosopher's ideal is associated with a responsible, deliberate legal act, when a judge understands the presence of indeterminacy and (while interpreting a term/a rule) makes an informed choice, also taking into account social objectives, values, consequences (Hart, 1983b, S. III; Kasatkin, 2016) . (Hart, 1983b, p. 66−68) .
2) Limitation of judicial discretion. According to Hart, in spite of "norm-sceptics"' (American legal realists) and proponents of natural law there is a hard "core" of meaning/norm. On the one hand, it provides a decision in clear cases, on the other hand, it limits (or is able to limit) a judge's choice to "penumbra" situations, while forming a basis and guides for exercising discretion (Ibid., p. 71−72). facts (Hart, 1951, p. 154−156; 1983b, p. 28 etc.;  1955, S. IV−V). Underlining a status of judicial utterances as decisions and not as descriptions in the 1949 essay (Hart, 1951, p. 155 
